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Prof. Dr. Sima Avramovic
University of Belgrade Faculty of Law
Goal of this paper is not only to offer an additional interpretation of histor
in the famous trial case in Iliad but to add a contribution to old methodolog-
ical dilemma of legal history. The question is whether similarities between
some legal institutions usually consequence of inter-influence among legal
systems and some sort of legal transplants or the likeness often arose out
of analogous social circumstances, level of development and alike societal
needs. It goes without saying that anthropological parallels are useful in
understanding and explaining similar institutions in different legal organ-
isms, but it makes sense only when interpretation of old and new sources is
completed. The anthropological approach in ancient Greek law was partic-
*1 This contribution is based upon a lecture that I gave at the University of Tokyo in
January 2014 due to courtesy of Prof. Yasunori Kassai. I also owe gratitude to many Japanese
colleagues for their valuable discussions, but in particularly to Omi Hatashin from Kyoto
Institute for English and Japanese Laws for a fruitful correspondence. Most of all my debt
goes to Prof. Gerhard Thür for his long lasting academic support and valuable comments on
that paper.
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ularly favored by David Cohen who claimed that “Strictly speaking, for the
study of Athenian law, Homer is no more relevant then the Twelve Tables,
or, for that matter, anthropological evidence frommodernAfrica”.*2 On the
other side, Gerhard Thür is rightly warning that “home-made and second-
hand anthropology” could be dangerous and that it should be performed in
reasonable boundaries.*3 In case of Homeric histor it seems that all rele-
vant sources from ancient Greece are already exhausted during the last two
centuries academic debates. Therefore it seems that there is a good excuse
to approach the issue by comparative analysis of similar institutions in soci-
eties with undeveloped legal systems during the process of their formation,
no matter when they appeared in history.
There is no doubt that famous blood-money trial described by Homer in
Iliad as a scene on the shield of Achilles has attracted attention of many
generations of scholars. But a few same guessing are still circulating and
it makes that fragment one of the most controversial and disputed places in
Homeric law. The problem is strongly reflected in very diverse translations
of provocative verses in Iliad 18, 497-508 as legal historians still did not
resolve many important elements of the case.
This is why one may meet in all languages quite dissimilar explanations
of that puzzling place in Homer. We will offer only some relevant
English translations,*4 although the same problem appears everywhere.
*2 D. Cohen, “Late Sources and the ‘Reconstruction’ of Greek Legal Institutions”, Sympo-
sion 1988, Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Köln – Wien
1990, 288. The same attitude Cohen repeats ad verbum in D. Cohen, “Greek Law – Prob-
lems and Methods”, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 106/1989, 92.
*3 G. Thür, “Oaths and Dispute Settlement in Ancient Greek Law”, Greek Law in its Polit-
ical Setting (ed. L. Foxhall, A.D.E. Lewis), Oxford 1996, 57-72.
*4 I am particularly grateful to Prof. Victor Castellani from the University of Denver, Chair
of the Department of Languages and Literatures, for offering me some most relevant or influ-
ential English translations of the Homer Iliad. Selection of the best English translations is not
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How to translate the word istor is an unavoidable headache particularly
for linguists, as the support of legal historians is not decisive enough.
However, the translation of that word causes many important conse-
quences in understanding what istor really was and what was his role in
the Homeric trial procedure.
1. HOMER, Iliad XVIII 497-508 — TEXTAND
TRANSLATIONS
λαοὶ δ᾽ εἰν ἀγορῇ ἔσαν ἀθρόοι: ἔνθα δὲ νεῖκος
ὠρώρει, δύο δ᾽ ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς
ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου: ὃ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ᾽ ἀποδοῦναι
δήμῳ πιφαύσκων, ὃ δ᾽ ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι: 500
ἄμφω δ᾽ ἱέσθην ἐπὶ ἴστορι πεῖραρ ἑλέσθαι.
λαοὶ δ᾽ ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπήπυον ἀμφὶς ἀρωγοί:
κήρυκες δ᾽ ἄρα λαὸν ἐρήτυον: οἳ δὲ γέροντες
εἵατ᾽ ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις ἱερῷ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ,
σκῆπτρα δὲ κηρύκων ἐν χέρσ᾽ ἔχον ἠεροφώνων: 505
τοῖσιν ἔπειτ᾽ ἤϊσσον, ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον.
κεῖτο δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐν μέσσοισι δύω χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
τῷ δόμεν ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι.
W. H. D. Rouse (1938)*5:
A crowd was in the market-place, where a dispute was going on. Two
men disputed over the blood-price of amanwho had been killed: one said he
had offered all, and told his tale before the people, the other refused to accept
an easy task, particularly for a lawyer, as very often a new English version of The Iliad comes
out.
*5 W.H.D. Rouse, The Iliad, Cambridge 1938.
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anything; but both were willing to appeal to an umpire for the decision. The
crowd cheered one or the other as they took sides, and the heralds kept them
in order. The elders sat at the Sacred Circle on the polished stones, and each
took the herald’s staff as they rose in turn to give judgment. Before them
lay two nuggets of gold, for the one who should give fairest judgment.
E. V. Rieu (1950)*6:
But the men had flocked to the meeting-place, where a case had come
up between two litigants, about the payment of compensation for a an who
had been killed. The defendant claimed the right to pay in full and was
announcing his intention to the people; but the other contested his claim
and refused all compensation. Both parties insisted that te issue should
be settled by a referee; and bother were cheered by their supporters in the
crowd, whom the heralds were attempting to silence. The Elders sat on the
sacred bench, a semicircle of polished stone; and each, as he received the
speaker’s rod from the clear-voiced heralds, came forward in his turn to
give his judgment staff in hand. Two talents of gold were displayed in the
centre: they were the fee for the Elder whose exposition of the law should
prove the best.
Richmond Lattimore (1951)*7:
The people were assembled in the market place, where a quarrel
had arisen, and two men were disputing over the blood price
for a man who had been killed. One man promised full restitution
in a public statement, but the other refused and would accept nothing.
Both then made for an arbitrator, to have a decision;
and people were speaking up on either side, to help both men.
*6 E. V. Rieu, The Iliad, By Homer, Middlesex 1950.
*7 R. Lattimore, The Iliad of Homer, Chicago 1951.
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But the heralds kept the people in hand, as meanwhile the elders
were in session on benches of polished stone in the sacred circle
and held in their hands the staves of the heralds who lift their voices.
The two men rushed before these, and took turns speaking their cases,
and between them lay on the ground two talents of gold, to be given
to that judge who in this case spoke the straightest opinion.
Robert Fitzgerald (1974)*8:
A crowd, then, in a market place, and there
two men at odds over satisfaction owed
for a murder done: one claimed that all was paid,
and publicly declared it; his opponent
turned the reparation down, and both
demanded a verdict from an arbiter,
as people clamored in support of each,
and criers restrained the crowd. The town elders
sat in a ring, on chairs of polished stone,
the staves of clarion criers in their hands,
with which they sprang up, each to speak in turn,
and in the middle were two golden measures
to be awarded him whose argument
would be most straightforward.
Martin Hammond (1987)*9:
The men had gathered in the market-place, where a quarrel was in
progress, two men quarrelling over the blood-moneyfor a man who had
bee killed: one claimed that we was making full compensation, and was
*8 R. Fitzgerald, Homer, The Iliad, New York 1974.
*9 M. Hammond, Homer: The Iliad. A New Prose Translation, London 1987.
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showing it to the people, but the other refused to accept any payment:
both were eager to take a decision from an arbitrator. The people were
taking sides, and shouting their support for wither an, while the heralds
tried to keep them in check. And the elders sat on the polished stone sears
in the sacred circle, taking the rod in their hands as they received it from
the loud-voiced heralds: then each would stand forward with the rod, and
give his judgment in turn. And two talents of gold lay on the ground in
the middle of their circle, to be given to the one who spoke the straightest
judgment.
Robert Fagles (1990)*10:
And the people massed, streaming into the marketplace
where a quarrel had broken out and two men struggled
over the blood-price for a kinsman just murdered.
One declaimed in public, vowing payment in full—
the other spurned him, he would not take a thing—
so both men pressed for a judge to cut the knot.
The crowd cheered on both, they took both sides,
but heralds held them back as the city elders sat
on polished stone benches, forming the sacred circle,
grasping in hand the staffs of clear-voiced heralds
and each leapt to his feet to plead the case in turn.
Two bars of solid gold shone on the ground before them,
a prize for the judge who’d speak the straightest verdict.
Michael Reck (1994)*11:
And a crowd had gathered where a quarrel
*10 R. Fagles, The Iliad, New York 1990.
*11 M. Reck, Homer: The Iliad, New York 1994.
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had arisen about the proper fine
for a murder: one man offered to pay,
another declined to accept the sum,
and both had requested arbitration.
The crowd stood cheering for their favorites
as heralds held them back, and the elders
sat on smooth stones in the sacred circle,
and each one held the herald’s staff in turn
when he sprang up to announce his verdict.
and in the middle lay two gold pieces
for the one whose judgment was accepted.
Stanley Lombardo (1997)*12:
There was a crowd in the market-place
And a quarrel arising between two men
Over blood money for a murder,
One claiming the right to make restitution,
The other refusing to accept any terms.
They were heading for an arbitrator
And the people were shouting, taking sides,
But heralds restrained them. The elder sat
On polished stone seats in the sacred circle
And held I their hands the staves of heralds.
The pair rushed up and pleaded their cases,
and between them lay two ingots of gold
For whoever spoke straightest in judgment.
*12 S. Lombardo, Homer Iliad, Indianapolis 2011.
122 Prof. Dr. Sima Avramovic
Anthony Verity (2011)*13:
In the meeting-place a crowd of citizens had formed;
a dispute had arisen there, and two men were quarreling
over the blood-money of a man who had been killed.
One claimed he had paid it in full, appealing to the people,
while the other said he had received nothing; both were anxious
to go to an arbitrator for judgement. The people took sides,
shouting support for both; heralds were holding them back,
while the elders say on polished stones in a sacred circle,
holding in their hands the loud-voiced heralds’ staffs.
The disputants rushed up to these men, and they gave their judgments
In turn; two talents of gold lay before them, to be given to
The judge who should deliver to them the straightest verdict.
Stephen Mitchell (2011)*14:
At the place of assembly, meanwhile, a crowd had gathered.
A quarrel had broken out, and two men were disputing
About the blood-price for someone who had been killed.
One man was claiming the right to pay for the death,
While the other refused to accept any compensation,
And each was eager to plead his case to the judges.
The people were cheering them on, some taking the side
Of one, some taking the other’s side, while the heralds
Tried to control the crowd, and the city elders
Were seated on polished stone chairs in the sacred circle,
Holding the heralds’ staffs. The men stood before them,
*13 A. Verity, The Iliad, Oxford 2011.
*14 S. Mitchell, The Iliad, New York 2011.
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And each made his case, and the elders rose and gave judgments.
Two bars of solid gold, one from each side,
Were displayed in the center; they were to be awarded
To the judge who was thought to give the clearest opinion.
The adequacy and accuracy of the translated verses of the Homeric poem
is very disputable and it exceeds general concern about exactness in trans-
lating ancient Greek legal texts. The old Italian male chauvinistic apho-
rism about translations and woman fits quite well to this situation: “Le
traduzioni sono come le donne. Quando sono belle non sono fedeli, e
quando sono fedeli non sono belle” (Carl Bertrand). But in Il. 18, 497-508
the attractiveness of translation it is not at stake. It is about something
much more important - about its content. Translating legal terminology
is particularly delicate as it depends on different legal cultures, distinc-
tive terminology, specific legal concepts, diverse backgrounds, etc. And in
the Homeric environment, which is not so well known to a modern reader
in general, explaining exact meaning of some terms looks like a mission
impossible at times. It refers particularly to the notion of the istor, as it is
not only a linguistic issue but much more a matter of how to understand
the essence of a legal institution.
Ending the overview of some routine English translations by linguists,
let us see the offers by two prestigious English speaking scholars
well acquainted with Greek history, culture and law. The first one is
N.G.L. Hammond, the author of the famous A History of Greece to 322
B.C., who suggests following:
”Men-at-arms were gathered together in assembly. There a quar-
rel had arisen between two men over retribution for the killing of a
man. One promised to give full compensation, making his declara-
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tion in public; the other refused to accept anything. Both were eager
to obtain a conclusion at the hands of one-who-knows. Men-at-arms
were speaking urgently in favor of each, supporting either side, and
the folk were being held back by the heralds. And the elders were
seated on polished stones in a sacred circle and theywere taking hold
of maces from the clear-voiced heralds. Then with the maces they
were starting up and giving judgment each in turn. In the midst of
themwere set two talents of gold, to be presented to whoever among
them should express his judgment in the straightest manner.”*15
The second distinguishes scholar, basically a historian, but also one of
the most knowledgeable modern authors in ancient Greek law, Douglas
Mac Dowel, offers translation of the trial scene as follows:*16
“In the assembly place were people gathered. There a dispute had
arisen: two men were disputing about the recompense (poin) for
a dead man. The one was claiming to have paid it in full, making
his statement to the people, but the other was refusing to receive
anything; both wished to obtain trial at the hands of a judge. The
people were cheering them both on, supporting both sides; and
heralds quieted the people. The elders sat on polished stones in a
sacred circle, and held in their hands sceptres from the loud-voiced
heralds; with these they were then hurrying forward and giving
their judgments in turn. And in the middle lay two talents of gold,
to give to the one who delivered judgment most rightly among
*15 N. Hammond, ”The Scene in Iliad 18, 497-508 and the Albanian Blood-Feud”, Bulletin
of the American Society of Papyrologists, 22 (1985), 81. Hammond believes that “one-who-
knows” is the elder whom the parties choose who convenes the assembly, 85, n. 24.
*16 D. M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, London 1978, 19.
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them” (18.497-508).
However, Mac Dowell discloses that lines 18.499-500 could be turned
into: ”the one was claiming to have paid it in full ..., but the other was
denying that he had received anything”.*17 It is clear that those two possible
translations (interpretations, understandings) of the legal issue and essence
of the dispute, can affect explanation of the role of istor. It means that
many options could be under consideration.
2. RELATED ISSUES
The whole scene is very curious, it offers plenty of different questions
and it generated diverse readings and hypothesis on many issues, apart of
the query who was the istor and what was his role. But all those problems
are interconnected in some aspects.
2.1
The first great, old controversy was mentioned by Mac Dowell in the
passage quoted above. What was core of the case? Was it a question of
facts: whether the blood-money for a homicide (poine) has been paid or
not? Or it was a legal question – whether the blood-money is acceptable or
not? Is it tolerable that a killer can pay a fine (ransom) for his act or not?
Could a blood-feud be replaced with a recompensation?
The issue was opened many decades ago, but it is not yet closed. After
a long relative accord that the scene is about accomplishment of a certain
blood-price, Sidgwick wrote in 1894: “But during the last twelve years
there has been a tendency to prefer an interpretation historically more
*17 Ibid.
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impressive, according to which the dispute is not about a mere payment of
money, but on the question whether a blood-feud shall be extinguished by
the acceptance of a composition”.*18 The battlefield is still open.
Curiously the older, traditional approach (issue of fact) was supported
mostly by lawyers or those whosemain field of expertise was ancient Greek
law.*19 The second opinion (issue of law) was mainly favored by linguists
and historians (of course, with considerable exceptions).*20 Supporting that
view, Leaf asked why should such a big social theatre be arranged if the
issue is only whether the sum of money has been paid or not? However,
the theory of legal issue appeared to have been more complicated, as new
questions and possible options inevitably aroused out of it. In Gagarin’s
words the disagreement is between the relatives of the victim who can not
agree about acceptance of the compensation.*21 Also, Gagarin points that
the amount in that case must have been so high that such a payment would
probably have been made in front of witnesses. A similar point was accu-
*18 H. Sidgwick, “The Trial Scene in Homer”, The Classical Review 8, 1-2 (1894), 1-3.
*19 Just to mention some of them followingWestbrook’s selection: G. Calhoun, The Growth
of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece, Berkeley 1927, 18; R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, The Admin-
istration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, I, Chicago 1930, 31-35; H. Hommel, ”Die
Gerichtsszene auf dem Schild des Achilleus. Zur Pflege des Rechts in homerischer Zeit”, in:
Palingenesia IV, Wiesbaden 1969, 16; A. Primmer, ”Homerische Gerichtsszenen”, Wiener
Studien 4 (1970) 11-13; E. Cantarella, Studi sull’ omicidio in diritto greco e romano, Milan
1976, 73-74. G. Thür, “Zum dikazein bei Homer”, Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung 87/1970,
426-444 is resolute that the dispute concerns a simple matter of facts, whether or not the poine
has been paid, whether the obligation was fulfilled or not, 431.
*20 W. Leaf, “The Trial Sceene in Iliad XVIII”, Journal of Hellenic Studies 8 (1887),
122-132; R. Köstler, Homerisches Recht, Wien 1950, 69; D. MacDowell, 19-20; M. Gagarin,
Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law, New Haven 1981, 13-16; M. Gagarin, Early
Greek Law, Berkeley 1989, 32-33; N. Hammond, 81; R. Westbrook, “The Trial Scene in the
Iliad”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 94/1992, 53-76, etc.
*21 M. Gagarin, (1981), 13-16.
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rately raised before him by Köstler.*22 Many other particular, additional
issues on that ground remained vague.
2.2
Closely related dilemma is whether the litigants have voluntarily
presented their dispute for settlement in front of the arbiter to avoid
self-help? Gagarin is one of the most famous contemporary followers of
the older, quite popular “Schiedsgerich Theorie” (arbitration theory).*23
According to his explanation the basileus or the group of elders offered
conciliation through the middle solution acceptable for both parties. In
that way the traditional arbitration theory was enhanced with the idea of
compromise.
The other hypothesis is less complicated and speculative. It asserts that
the killer has sought protection against the forceful use of self-help, claim-
ing that he has paid a ransom – poine, and therefore he is supposed to avoid
revenge? Consequently the subject is a matter of fact – whether or not the
defendant has paid a wergild, blood-money, poine. Accordingly the case
was not a private arbitration, but a kind of public control of self-help. This
assumption has been raised by Wolff and was widely accepted for many
years by the majority of scholars, particularly by legal historians.*24 On
*22 M. Gagarin, (1989), 28-33. R. Köstler, Homerisches Recht, Wien 1950, 69.
*23 M. Gagarin, (1989), 27. Arbitration theory was accepted by many important old author-
ities like J. H. Lipsius, Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, Leipzig 1905-1915, 6;
R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, I, 31; K. Latte, Heiliges Recht, Tübingen 1920, 2f; M. Calhoun,
Introduction to Greek Legal Science, Oxford 1944. 9, etc. General idea of that theory was
that private arbitration has been gradually transformed into a compulsory trial before public
authorities.
*24 H. J.Wolff, “The Origin of Judicial Litigation among the Greeks”, Traditio 4/1946, 31-87
(34 pp.). His approach was accepted by many famous scholars like A. R. W. Harrison, The
Law of Athens, II, Oxford 1971, 69-72, E. Ruschenbusch, „Der Ursprung des gerichtlichen
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the other hand Gagarin has revived the arbitration theory, together with the
claims that a legal issue is at stake.*25
After convincing criticism of Gagarin’s contemplations considering
arbitration concept, Thür turned back to Wolff’s approach. But, Thür
also opposed to some elements of Wolff’s theory and tried to modify
it. Wolff was claiming that the elders had to resolve immediately and
definitely the case (taking into account reactions of the gathered people,
who supported by shouting judgment of the most convincing elder).
However, Thür believes that each elder proposed not a final decision but
only formulated an oath (a method of proof, Beweisurteil) and decided
which of the litigants had to submit it.*26 Thus, Thür reiterates attitude
that the issue is simply about the fact – whether or not poine has been paid.
On the other side, on the basis of comparative data from the Near East
legal systems and oriental legal traditions, Westbrook asserts that the court
was not deciding only about the facts (accomplishing of poine), but also
whether the plaintiff is entitled to revenge.*27 Though, due to relatively
recent contributions by Cantarella and Thür, it seems that in this moment
Rechtsstreits bei en Griechen“, in: Symposion 1977, Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenis-
tischen Rechtsgeschichte, Cologne 1982, 1-8, etc.
*25 M. Gagarin, (1989), 31-33. Before Gagarin it was H. Hommel, ”Die Gerichtsszene auf
dem Schild des Achilleus. Zur Pflege des Rechts in homerischer Zeit”, in: Palingenesia IV,
Wiesbaden 1969, 11-38 (p. 16) who reaffirmed the arbitration.
*26 G. Thür, “Oath and Dispute Settlement in Ancient Greek Law”, in: Greek Law in its
Political Setting: Justification not Justice (ed. L. Foxhall, A. Lewis), Oxford 1996, 61: “the
magistrate does not decide on guilt or innocence but only gives a judgement about the oath-
formula which, if taken, will automatically resolve the dispute“. His view was supported by
R. Sealey, The Justice of the Greeks, Ann Arbor 1994, 100.
*27 R. Westrbook, “The Trial Scene in the Iliad”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology,
94/1992, 53. His view was followed by G. Nagy, “The Shield of Achilles. Ends of the Iliad
and beginning of the Polis”, in: New Light on Dark Age (ed. S. Langdon), Columbia, London
1997, 194.
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prevailing view is that the Homeric trial scene is not an arbitration process
but public control of self-help, and that its subject matter was the issue of
facts.*28
2.3
The next controversial issue is who is entitled to get the two talents and
who is paying them? This is also an old debate: “some understand that
the two talents of gold are to go to the judge who gives the best judgment,
others that they are to go to the litigant who pleads his cause best”, as Sidg-
wick also put it by the end of the last century.*29 We do not know much
more today. Is it a blood-price that goes to the victim’s family, a bet of
the two parties which will be taken by the winner, like a genuine wergild
deposit?*30 Or it was a judicial wager (fee, award) that goes to the elder
who gives the best verdict, a kind of a “court fee”?*31 Myres supposed
that it was a customary fee for someone who gives a voluntary decision
from the agora (crowd), if this decision was adopted by the elders as better
than their own.*32 Wolff believes that the two talents were to go to the
*28 E. Cantarella, “Dispute Settlement in Homer: once again on the Shield of Achilles”,
in: Mélanges en l’honneur Panayotis D. Dimakis, Athens 2002, 147-165 (= E. Cantarella,
“Dispute Settlement in Homer: once again on the Shield of Achilles”, in: Diritto e società
in Grecia e a Roma, Milano 2012, 171-192); G. Thür, “Der Reinigungseid im archaischen
griechischen Rechtsstreit und seine Parallelen im Alten Orient”, in: Rechtsgeschichte und
Interkulturalität (eds. R. Rollinger, H. Barta, M. Lang), Wiesbaden 2007, 179-195).
*29 H. Sidgwick, 1. R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, 37-38 outline in details different explanations of
the two talents purpose.
*30 J. H. Lipsius, 4. He was followed by many others in that view.
*31 G. Glotz, La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce, Paris 1904, 128.
Similar was the view of Sir H. S. Maine, Ancient Law, London 1861, 386. He argued that
the amount was a deposit by the litigants for the judge who shall explain the grounds of his
decision most to the satisfaction of the audience.
*32 J. L. Myres, Political Ideas of the Greeks, New York 1927, 64.
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elder who won the greatest applause from the crowd.*33 But, there is also
another controversial issue opened by Dareste a long time ago connected to
that amount: are the two talents a sum of money that goes as an extra value
to the winner, which he will take along with the initial amount which was
at stake?*34 Those are very problematic, peculiar and extremely arguable
topics to deal with in this moment, particularly as the list of question are
not closed.
2.4
And, finally, the most important point for us here is: who is in charge to
decide the case? Gathered people, a crowd, a kind of democratic body, as
A. Lanni states, following Mac Dowell’s and Wolff’s basic reasoning?*35
If not the people, gerontes were supposed to decide through a formal
public procedure, as Gagarin and many others suggest. The source is
quite explicit by saying that they, the elders dikazon (line 18.506) –
give a verdict.*36 Also, as mentioned, Thür has offered an interesting
compromising idea that gerontes do not propose a concrete settlement of
the dispute but rather a method of proof (Beweisverfahren).*37
*33 H. J. Wolff, (1946), 42.
*34 R. Dareste, “Sur un passage de l’Iliade”, in: Annuaire de l’Association pour l’encour-
agement des études grecques en France 18/1884, 94.
*35 A. Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens, Cambridge 2006, 139 fn. 89.
She claims that in the trial scene depicted on the shield of Achilles, „the crowd played a
vital role in the decision making process: various elders take turns wielding the scepter and
suggesting a ruling, but it is the crowd who decides by acclamation which ruling is accepted“;
D. M. MacDowell, 21; H. J. Wolff, (1946), 41. Of course, the presence of people is not
irrelevant, but it is quite doubful if they had a final say in making decisions.
*36 Parties plead their case in a public forum (in the agora) to a circle of elders, each of whom
in turn takes a scepter (a symbol of public authority), stands, and pronounces a settlement.
Clearly this is a formal, public procedure, providing ameans for litigants to bring their disputes
to an authoritative body for settlement, M. Gagarin, (1986), 26-33.
*37 G.Thür, (1996), 57-73: gerontes offered amethod of proof bymeans of which the dispute
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But, what is then the role of istor? Why is he present at all? Why the
people expect some say by him? Is his say a kind of verdict? And, conse-
quently, is he a kind of judge or at least an arbiter? Mac Dowel suggests
three possibilities. According to him, istor can be: a) the chairman of the
proceedings (either the king, or an elder who presides over the others); b)
the elder whose opinion is considered by the people to be the best (the opin-
ion which receives the most applause is the one which is accepted); c) it
refers to all the elders, and the view of the majority prevails. Although he
claims that none of solutions can be definitely disproved, he inclines to b),
and stresses the role of people who will decide which elder’s judgment is
to be accepted.*38
Let us remember that almost all translations suggest that the istor is
either a judge or an arbiter (nevertheless some translators try to soften the
word “arbiter” with “umpire” or “referee”). However, both the first and the
second theory (judge or arbiter) are facing with a great problem: how to
explain the relationship between the istor and the gerontes then?*39 If the
istor is a judge, what are the gerontes doing then? If the istor is an arbiter
and his opinion ends the dispute, what kind of role should play a body of
the distinguished elders? Or, as many scholars suppose, the istor is to be
found amongst the elders: the istor will be the one who wins the award
(Dareste, Wolff).*40
will automatically be settled (and let us add: it could explain the presumption that one who
suggested the best „method“ achieves the award, a kind of judicial wager). According to his
opinion, the dispute is about a simple matter of fact, whether or not the poine has been paid.
*38 D. Mac Dowell, 20-21.
*39 This is also an old dilemma raised by H. J. Wolff, (1946), 37-38. He reveals Jolowicz’s
comparative law explanation based upon comparison of the istor with the English jury in its
most primitive form and with the medieval Germanic law.
*40 G. Thür (1996), 67 is resolutely against that general assumption with sound reasons.
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3. THE ISTOR – NEITHERA JUDGE NORANARBITER
Let us try to add to the vivid discussion a bit different approach, which
would not confront or merge the roles of the istor and of the gerontes. My
presumption is that the istor was something else, a kind of a separate “insti-
tution”, a specific authority which is neither a judge nor an arbiter. The
explanation is going to be based upon linguistic arguments, other verses
in Iliad where istor was mentioned, and to some cases from comparative
legal history.
R. Westbrook, in his comparative manner, tries to explain the trial scene
in Iliad having in mind parallels with legal tradition and procedure in
murder cases ofAncient East. He explains many controversial Greek terms
from the trial scene (eaikheto, apondoanai, panta, piphauskōn, anaineto,
helisthai),*41 but avoids to clarify istor and gerontes topic. No wonder,
as there are many linguistic obstacles, apart from the difficulty upcoming
from the common sense: if the istor decides, what is then the role of the
elders? And, on the contrary, if the gerontes are those who are supposed
to rule, why should be istor involved in the whole procedure? The only
remaining rescue theory which became quite popular is that the istor was
one of the gerontes (the one who gives the best verdict).*42 However, this
popular attitude meets an unpleasant linguistic obstacle: the poet says epi
istori peirai elesthai, not that the istor is supposed to dikazein. Dikazein
is a job of the collective body of the gerontes, as clearly pointed in verse
*41 “The one was claiming (eaikheto) to pay (apondoanai) all (panta) expounding
(piphauskōn) to the demos; the other was refusing (anaineto) to take (helisthai)”, R. West-
brook 73-76.
*42 To mention only H. J. Wolff, (1946), 38; Mac Dowell, 20; M. Gagarin, 31. But G. Thür,
(1996), 67 rightly states that he would disassociate the istor from the elder winning the award.
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18.506.*43
This is probably why Fagles (1990) has found the best solution in his
English translation by avoiding words like “decision” or “verdict” or “arbi-
tration”, which was so frequently used by other translators. He opted for
a more flexible wording for peirai elesthai - to “cut the knot”, similarly as
Rieu (1950) translated it more neutrally with “should be settled”.*44 They
do not take for granted in what capacity will the istor act (judge, arbiter
or something else) and what kind of legal effect will his statement have
(verdict, decision, judgment, or simply a statement).
Also, if one wants to keep more or less dependably with the phrasing
of the original text, epi (istori) should be translated “in front of (istor)” or
maybe “at the hands of (istor)”, like Mac Dowell translates. It is hardly
related to a certain decision making procedure “by”, “from” the istor. The
parties simply wanted to solve their case in his presence on the basis of
his statement.*45 Shortly, at philological ground nothing suggests that the
*43 G. Thür, (1996), 67 has shown that theory about the istor as one of geronteswho gave the
best ruling (as Wolff believed) is not convincing, as well as Mac Dowell’s statement that the
istor is “the elder whose opinion is considered by the people to be the best”. It is a very spec-
ulative idea, particularly when it is connected with the role of the crown allegedly supposed
to decide which decision was the best. The issue of how could it be done (through applauds
or cheers), as Mac Dowell suggests, is also very speculative. It was evidently not performed
by some voting procedure.
*44 Or “to obtain a limit” as Elmer suggested recently, D. F. Elmer, The Poetics of Consent,
Collective Decision Making and the Iliad, Baltimore 2013, 186.
*45 I am grateful to comment by Omi Hatashin during my lecture at the University of Tokyo,
who pointed latter in our correspondence, that the Greek preposition epi takes the correspond-
ing genitive case when it means ‘near’, ‘in the presence of’, or ‘by’ (locality). Therefore, the
relevant text should read epi istoros (genitive case) in order to mean ‘in the presence of istor“.
But, epi istori in dativ suggests that iēmi in the context of Iliad XVIII 501 is a verb of motion,
and it could rather be translated as „relying on the evidence (testimony) of a witness“. In that
case, the istor could be a witness, but also any other person on whose statement depends the
decission.
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istor was a person who was supposed to give a judgment (dikazein). And,
of course, as istor is used in singular, there is no room to compare him
with a collective body of the gerontes, elders (except in very problematic
theory that the istor is one of the elders, possibly the one who offers the
best decision).
In consequence, it seems that proper philological argumentation for
translation and understanding that the istor gives a final decision or a
verdict is missing. It should imply that the istor was not a judge. He was
probably doing something else.
3.1
The problem with translation is difficult as the word istor is quite vague
and unclear. The root-value of the word, related to the irregular verb
(w)oida, with the stem wid- indicates “awareness” or “knowing” of some
kind - “seeing” as correct perception.*46 Application of the same word
in Hesiod, and in tragedy centuries later as both Sophocles and Euripides
use it, suggests that an (h)istor is “experienced, aware, in the know”, „one
who knows“,*47one who saw something. Worth mentioning is that many
Slavic languages use the same root, better to say the same word – noun
*46 Digamma (w) was a part of the word (w)oida, so that istor was in Boeotian and maybe
epic-Aeolian – (w)istor. I am thankfull to Prof. Victor Castelani for this opservation and
discussions of the issue, particularly for explaining the use of istor in Hesiod, Sophocles and
Euripides that follows.
Gagarin, 31 n. 37 also asserts that the word histor (with initial h, and adds in brackets
„arbiter“!) is deriving from a root meaning „ to see, to know“. But, he is of opinion, without
any argument, that it designates not a person who knows a particular fact but someone who
has the general wisdom to settle disputes!
It is curious that in all editions of the Liddle-Scott Dictionary there is no translation for the
word istor as a noun. There is only explanation of the verb istoreō with meanings of „exam-
ine, observe, inquire of, ask“, etc, but also „to give an account of what one has learnt, record”,
G. Liddell, R. Scott, 842.
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vid (to denote „eyesight“) and verb - videti („to see“), equaly as video in
Latin. In that sense oida could mean „I know what I have seen“. The istor
is consequently the one who saw something and who therefore knows
something well.
Does such etymology points to a judge or arbiter? Does the whole word-
ing of the line 18.501 points to judicial decission? Maybe yes for a contem-
porary reader, but it is doubtful how it was percieved in the Homeric time.
Not only logical discrepancy in relationship istor/gerontes, as mentioned
above, points that the istor can not be neither an arbiter nor a judge (or one
of the elders who gave the best verdict). There is also an important philo-
logical ground - istor does not dikazen but peirar helesthai. The phrasing
peirar helesthai (line 18.501), often translated as ”decision”, should rather
be „end“, „obtain a limit“ effected by means of hearing what will the istor
say. He does not make a decision, but he „resolves“ the issue „cuts the
knot“ by his statement. In my view, “to end the dispute” would be the most
convenient translation of that phrase. And after the istor’s peirar helesthai,
the real, final decision is in the hands of the elders who are supposed to
dikazein.
What could the statement by the istor deal with, what could it be about,
what could be its content and purpose? Of course, the answer depends on
the two main hypothetical general possibilities connected to the character
of the dispute.
The first one is that the issue was one of facts. In that case the istormight
have been a competent person to say (attest, confirm, report) if the amount
was properly paid or not. If so, it would mean the end of the story and no
further decision would be needed. But if he asserts that the amount was not
*47 R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, I, 35, n. 2 and H. J. Wolff, (1946), 38 state firmly that the word
istor means “expert or one who knows”.
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appropriate or was paid only partially, it opens the room for the decision of
men of wisdom, respectable gerontes, what to do next. They should offer
different possibilities on what will be the consequence in that case.
The second possibility – that the matter of controversy was a legal issue
– includes at least two potential roles of istor. Firstly, as a person who was
present during previous cases as a kind of an official in charge to memorize
what he had seen, he could only give a statement on what he remembers
about the similar cases (istor – a rememberer). Secondly, in the same time,
he is supposed to remember the outcome of the actual case in order to attest
in the future what the result was in this case at stage.
On these terms, istor would again be neither a judge nor an arbiter, but
only a person whowill offer a preliminary relevant statement about what he
knows. Of course, this is a speculative presumption, but all other solutions
of the trial scene in Iliad are more or less hypothetical as well. In any case,
philology and wording of the poem does not favor conclusion about istor
as a judge or an arbiter.
This is why in this moment, after so many different English transla-
tions, Thür’s German attempt of translation offers the most moderate and
sensible way. He avoids any modern term as a possible explanation for
the istor and stays with the Greek specific word, suggesting some possi-
ble meanings in parenthesis: “Beide waren bereit, bei einem istor (einem
‘Wissenden’: Schiedsrichter, Richter, Zeugen?) die entgültige Entschei-
dung zu nehmen”.*48 It fits well to Bonner-Smith’s translation “expert”
or “one who knows”.*49 Cantarella made an important step forward by
*48 G. Thür, “Der Reinigungseid im archaischen griechischen Rechtsstreit und seine Paralle-
len im Alten Orient”, in: R. Rollinger, H. Barta eds., Rechtsgeschichte und Interkulturalität,
Wiesbaden 2007, 182. Just to add that Wolff, who argued against arbitration theory, did not
find a better translation for istor apart of daysman (mediator), H. J. Wolff, (1946), 37.
*49 R. J. Bonner, G. Smith, I 35, n. 2; H. J. Wolff, (1946), 38.
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suggestion that the istor was a person who had been present at the moment
of payment, but not as a simple witness. Instead, he had played a specific
role in delivering the poine, similar to the role played by Odysseus during
the payment of the ransom to Achilles in Iliad, 19.*50
Therefore, as Canteralla has clearly shown, “one who knows” might not
only be an arbiter, judge or witness. Comparative legal history could offer
other possibilities as well. So we come to the core of the issue. But, before
that, let us shortly recall another place in the Iliad where istor was also
mentioned.
3.2
A kind of help might come from the only instance left in the Iliad where
Homer uses the same word istor, depicting another famous scene of the
funeral games. In the Iliad 23, 486 Idomeneus and LittleAjax are in dispute
over which of them has correctly recognized whose horses and chariot are
in the lead, and they propose laying a bet on it and appointingAgamemnon
as istor. But Agamemnon is also their superior, Achaean commander-in-
chief, and would be unlikely to decide until he can see for himself! Eyewit-
ness, testis, observer, spectator, bystander fits well to this situation. It might
resemble a modern reader to the function of witness. But he was surely not
a witness in a juridical sense, as he was not produced by one party for the
purpose of confirming his plea.*51 Gagarin believes thatAgamemnon is an
arbiter in this case and that he decides the outcome of the race.*52 However,
it would be quite bizarre for the king Agamemnon to be a witness or an
arbiter in such a trivial situation. He could only, at the very least, give
*50 E. Cantarella, (2002), 160-161; (2012), 186-187.
*51 It was rightly observed already by H. J. Wolff, (1946), 38.
*52 M. Gagarin, (1986), 37 n. 37.
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a statement on his impression (knowledge) according to his perception of
what he had seen.
In addition Thür claims quite plausibly that Agamemnon was not
supposed to decide outcome of the race: in the event everybody will be
able to observe who actually the first is. According to Thür, Agamemnon’s
only task would have been to hold the stake money and hand it over to
the winner. That is why Thür believes that Agamemnon did not have to
act as arbitrator, rather he was a guarantor for the bet’s being enforced
correctly.*53
Some parallels could be detected between the two Homeric scenes,
although word istor was used in the shield scene in a quite different
context than in the chariot race (different circumstances, different social
rank of istor, and different societal importance of the case). The istor is
the one who knows something from his personal experience (“knower”),
who acts as a person of public faith about something that he observed by
his own eyes, and who is at some point supposed to give a statement on
what he knows and who guarantees fair outcome. Nothing more than that.
It depends on his authority what this statement will mean and what kind of
power and effect his statement will have.
In any case, statement of the istor is not a judgment, a verdict in a legal
sense. Verdict (as a possible outcome of dikazein in 18.506 and 508) is
a result of certain procedure. The istor is only supposed to give a report
(statement) which can help in solving the dispute due to his authority. In
the same way Agamemnon was not formally a judge in the case of chariot
race but only a person who saw the event and whose opinion is reliable.
Therefore Hammond is strongly convinced that there is no doubt: istor
*53 G. Thür, (1996), 67.
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in the Achilles’ shield scene means ”one who knows,” as well as in Iliad
23.486.*54 I would put it in a more general and broader way: as a result of
seeing something (oida), the istor is a person who knows something and
reports on that as a person of public authority.
3.3
Finally, we come to the most sensitive point – possible arguments from
comparative legal history and anthropology. Of course, the value of such
material is often at question.*55 But, we evidently miss more secure expla-
nations in Greek sources, etymology and literature of the real meaning of
istor and in particularly of his role in judicial procedure. This is whyWolff
firmly believes that the shield scene “is one of the cases where the compar-
ative method is the way to illuminate a story which is not told with suffi-
cient precision”.*56 Therefore it makes sense to take into account exam-
ples from other early, preliterate or mostly illiterate societies, socially and
culturally corresponding to the Homeric world.*57 Similar problems often
find similar responses in various civilizations. A great common problem
of early societies and their judgments was oral ruling and lack of writing
*54 N. G. L. Hammond, 81.
*55 G. Thür, (1996), 57 rightly points that there is a risk in anthropological approach. Simi-
larities could sometimes be missleading. But at some point anthropological and comparative
approach remains the only way out if the evidence from sources has been fully exhausted. In
Homeric schield scene, after many decades of disputes, there is not much left in Greek sources
to be examined.
*56 H. J. Wolff, (1946), 35.
*57 M. Gagarin, (1989), 30-31 also tries to find some explanations of the trial scene in
Homer using the analogy with some African societies. K. A. Raaflaub, “Homeric Society”
in: I. Mooris, B. Powell (eds.), A New Companion to Homer, Leiden 1997, 648 asserts that,
generally speaking, customs in early societies have their analogies in other cultures and can
be decoded with the help of anthropology and sociology.
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and evidence.*58
3.3.1
The first institution comparable to the istor comes from the Cretan city
of Gortyn. Fortunately, its legal system is quite well known due to well
preserved “Code of Gortyn” from the V century B.C.*59 Nevertheless the
time gap between Homeric period and the time of the Gortyn codifica-
tion, some parallels could be legitimate, as those two societies shared simi-
lar difficulties in the time when writing was not widespread. So we find
in Gortyn quite well-known and important court official – the mnamon
(the Doric form of the word, having the root in mneme, mnemoneuo –
“remember”, with a specific Doric “a” instead of Attic “e”). Therefore
the mnamon is “remembrancer”, “rememberer”. “memorizer”, “recorder”,
“a man of memory”.*60 If one follows etymology, sense and logic of the
word mnamon, its meaning is very close to the istor as “one who knows”.
One of the duties of the mnamon in Gortyn was to keep the record in his
mind while he is alive and to give information of previous decisions when
it is needed.*61 He is a person whose duty is to see, to watch, to follow
the case and to remember its outcome.*62. He is a “living archive” of cases
*58 A valuable book considering ancient Greek experience in law and writing produced
M. Gagarin, Writing Greek Law, Cambridge 2011.
*59 R. Willetts, The Code of Gortyn, Berlin 1967 is still the most useful edition with English
translation.
*60 A. Lanni, (2006), 126 n. 39 translatesmnamon as “rememberer”, also inA. Lanni, “Prece-
dent and Legal Reasoning in Classical Athenian Courts: A Noble Lie?“, The American Jour-
nal of Legal History, 43, 1 (1999), 27-51 (46). J. Davies, “The Code of Gortyn”, in: The
Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (ed. M. Gagarin, D. Cohen), Cambridge 2005,
310 translates mnamon as “rememberancer”.
*61 Code of Gortyn, IX 31: “If the suit be with reference to a judgment won, the judge and
the recorder… shall testify”. Therefore R.Willetts, 47 translates theremnamon as “recorder”.
*62 Mnamon is also mentioned explicitly in the Code of Gortyn, XI 16 but rather as a kind of
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which were decided in the past, a person who keeps in his memory judi-
cial processes. It is rightly claimed that the mnamon “share with the judge
the potential power of being a witness to the results of past cases, hence
both officials have authoritative knowledge”.*63 The mnamon was helping
Cretan kosmoi and only in the long flow of legal history they ended up as
scribes in Hellenistic inscriptions. Beside mnamones in Gortyn and Crete,
some other Greek places used hieromnamones with the same or similar
function (Tyrins,Argos, Mycene, Delphi and in Peloponnesus).*64 It seems
that a comparable institution was quite widespread all over Greece, proba-
bly as a remnant of a common, earlier legal tradition. Although there is no
solid source to confirm connection between the two institutions, a kind of
analogy sounds at least plausible. In the preliterate societies, nevertheless
the time distance, the istor could have had a similar role like the mnamon
in Gortyn and other parts of Greece centuries latter.*65 At least the istor
judiciary official: “…and he shall deposit ten staters with the court, and the secretary (of the
magistrate) who is concerned with strangers shall pay it to the person renounced“ (Willetts,
49 translates mnanon here as “the secretary”). Mnamon is mentioned for the third time in
Code of Gortyn, XI 53: “and let the initiator of the suit make his denunciation to the woman
and the judge and the secretary (of the court)” – Willetts’ translation is “the secretary” again.
*63 R. Thomas, “Writing, Law andWritten Law”, in: The Cambridge Companion to Ancient
Greek Law, Cambridge 2005, 48. M. Gagarin, „Written text and the Art of Literature“,
in: H. Yunis, Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece, Cambridge
2003, 59-77 rightly observes that at Gortyn, the mnamon continues to remember oral judi-
cial proceedings even after writing has been established, 63. He also rightly adds that they
remembered the proceedings and outcomes of trials and certain other matters, but they did not
remember rules, which were now preserved in writing. Nor is there any evidence that they
remembered the outcomes of earlier cases as precedents or rules for new cases, 68.
*64 R. Thomas, “Written in Stone? Liberty, Equality, Orality and the Codification of Law“,
in: Greek Law in the Political Settings, Oxford 1996, 9-32. This is one of the best overviews
in the literature of the role and evolution of mnamones in ancient Greece, 18.
*65 I am following here the path of thinking traced by L. Margetić, „Pokušaj pravne inter-
pretacije sudske scene naAhilovu štitu“ [AnAttempt to Interpret the Trial Scene at the Schield
of Achilles], Zbornik radova posvećen Albertu Vajsu, Beograd 1966, 51-58.
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was a person of public authority, a person who knows (remembers) some-
thing and reports on that at the court in circumstances when there were no
written records of any legal or judicial acts.
3.3.2
A very similar tradition is well attested within the old Slav customary
law, among many Slavic people during the time of illiteracy. Pristav was a
person of “public faith”,*66 engaged to assist to the judge in running judi-
cial procedure. In the transitional period when the court decisions were
not written, but given only orally by the judge, pristav “was given” to the
person who won the case as a warranty, in order to have a valid proof in the
future about the result of the trial. Although pristav assisted to the judge in
some other procedural actions, his most important duty was to report about
the outcome of certain cases.*67 Pristav was not a court official compara-
ble to the judge, both in knowledge, social background and authority. But,
he was usually a person from a well known family, with social respect and
prestige, in any case a person of public faith. That institution and person
were highly respected, as they helped society to avoid new quarrels and
disputes about results of some earlier cases and to ensure a kind of judicial
*66 The most comprehensive book on pristav is M. Kostrenčić, Fides publica (javna vera) u
pravnoj istoriji Srba i Hrvata do kraja XV veka [Fides publica (public faith) in Legal History
of Serbs and Croats up to the end of XV century], Beograd 1930. At some point Kostrenčić
compares the functions of mnamon and pristav, 68. He claims that in the time when litteracy
was not yet well developed and when judgments were not writen, it was a problem to fix the
court rulings. Therefore pristav had to be present all the time during the court procedure,
particularly when the judgment was given. At the end of the process the judge would attribute
the pristav to the winning party to help him in the judgment enforcement or to help to interpret
the essence of the court decission at some latter point, M. Kostrenčić, 21.
*67 This role of pristav is nearly the same as the role ofmnamon in the Code of Gortyn IX 31.
M. Kostrenčić, 5 defines pristav as a person whose oral statements were protected as those of
public faith.
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stability and continuity.
Pristav kept a condensed memory of courts and rulings in undeveloped,
illiterate societies. Only gradually, during a long process, they were trans-
formed into assistants of the judges.*68 It is clear that in the beginning
pristav was not a permanent judicial position – he was only attributed by a
judge to the winning party for a particular case as a guarantee, in order to
facilitate enforcement of judgement or even to help in clarification of the
court decission if necessary. If a problem arises pristav was there to give a
statement about the facts that he had seen and knows, always in the pres-
ence of the interested parties. This is why Slavic medieval sources define
pristav as assertor veritatis or the one who is used pro testimonio or “for a
stronger conviction”.*69 He was not supposed to have any kind of profes-
sional experience but only to be recognized by the society as an honest
and impartial person. As attested in sources from medieval Dalmatia they
were latter also used to call upon parties to the trial, to perform prelimi-
nary investigation, to test witnesses, to be present during the oath taking
procedure, etc. Only gradually, in the final development of the institution,
pristav became a kind of the scribe and at the very end of development a
kind of the notary public.*70
Illiterate societies or those with a poor literacy had a serious problem
of recording the court decisions. Although the corresponding institutions
in the Gorton Code (mammon) and the old Slavic person authorized by
*68 The developed function of the pristav has a very significant parallel to mnamon in the
Code of Gortyn XI 16. Therefore S. Novaković, Zakonik Stefana Dušana cara srpskog [Code
of Stephen Dushan, the Serbian Tzar], Beograd 1898 (commentary with theArt. 56) perceives
pristav as an assistant of a judge.
*69 M. Kostrenčić, 16.
*70 S. Avramović, “Pravnoistorijski aspekti notarijata” [Aspects of Notary Public in Legal
History] in: Javnobeležničko pravo, Beograd 2005, 35-83.
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customary law (presto) are so distant in terms of time, their function, social
environment, at least some analogy in logic and purpose of the two insti-
tutions is significant. Consequently they could be a kind of road sign to
clarify the role of the istor in Homer.
3.3.3
Quite a long time ago Leaf had launched an idea, basically the one
expressed before him by Sir Arthur Evans, that customary material from
Northern Albania could be of some help in understanding the Homeric
trial scene.*71 However, Leaf complained that the evidence is scarce and
expected that Evans will report more on the blood-feud in North Albania.
But it did not happen as Evans moved soon to Montenegro and Crete.*72
About a century latter, in 1980’s, Hammond stressed again importance
of studying Albanian habit as a possible source for better consideration
of the trial in Iliad and gave an outline on that.*73 He had recalled his
*71 W. Leaf, “The Trial Scene in Iliad XVIII”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8 (1887),
122-132.
*72 Missing that, Leaf recalls examples from early Roman law to explain the trial scene
in Homer. In the prevalent comparativist manner of that time, he believed that a signpost
could be found in the interesting passage mentioned in Sir Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient
Law (375-377 of the fifth edition). He connects the Iliad trial scene with the early Roman
procedure of legis actio sacramenti. He believed that the “Roman praetor is represented here
by the istor, referee or ‘daysman’, to whom both parties are anxious to leave the settlement
of the dispute”. But, as the case in the Iliad is not private one, which the praetor can decide
without more ado, the istor therefore cannot determine it alone and he must call the council to
his aid, W. Leaf, 127. Although this Roman parallel is very problematic, it clearly shows that
efforts to explain the trial scene in Iliad by comparative primitive procedures in other legal
systems are inevitable.
*73 He offered a short contribution with a similar approach – to link the trial scene from
Homeric society with theAlbanian customary law of a more recent time, N. Hammond, ”The
Scene in Iliad 18, 497-508 and the Albanian Blood-Feud”, Bulletin of the American Society
of Papyrologists, 22 (1985), 79-86.
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travel and research inAlbania in the 1930’s and the researches of Margaret
Hasluck.*74 He mainly accepts her findings, and his parallels are mostly
based upon comparisons with the procedure as founded in the so called
Code of Leke Dukagjini (Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit).*75 Hammond mainly
deals with the most controversial rules of the Kanun (on procedure how
murder was handled to avoid blood-feud, particularly in book 10, articles
886-990). Nevertheless his great authority in ancient Greek history,*76 he
used second hand sources for Albanian customary law and he missed to
investigate more profoundly two important institutions, those which could
be more closely connected to the Homeric trial scene. No wonder that
he miss them. Many papers dealing with those old Albanian customary
institutions are mostly published in languages which are not so easily
accessible (Albanian, Serbian).
Indeed, there are some interesting andmore compatiblematerials coming
from the research of customary law ofAlbanians in the area of Kosovo and
Metohia (not only Northern Albania). It comes from a few works written
in Serbian language, including two PhD thesis defended at the University
of Belgrade in 1973 and 1978. They have never been published so that
their results are not easy accessible *77 However, two customary institutions
*74 M. Hasluck, The Unwritten Law in Albania, Cambridge 1954, 210-60.
*75 The Code was allegedly formed in the 15th century by Leka Dukagjini, most prob-
ably in oral form. The rules were collected and written down only in the 19th century
by a Catholic priest Shtjefën Gjeçovi. The full version was first published in Albanian as
Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit, Shkodër 1933 after Gjeçovi’s death in 1926. The translation
in Serbo-Croat language appeared as Kanon Leke Dukadjinija, Zagreb 1986. An English
version was published as The Code of Lekë Dukagjini, Arranged by Gjeçov Shtjefën, Trans-
lated with an introduction by L. Fox, New York 1989. See also G. Trnavci, The Albanian
Customary Law and the Canon of Lekë Dukagjini: a Clash or Synergy with Modern Law,
http://www.design.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~hoken/Kazuhiko/2008Customarylaw.pdf.
*76 Let us just mention N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Oxford 1986.
*77 M. Djuričić, Lično jemstvo u običajnom pravu Arbanasa u severnoj Metohiji - dorzonija
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thoroughly examined in those two dissertations are particularly interesting
for the Achilles’ shield trial scene.
The first one is plechnija, a court of elders, which was already mentioned
by Leaf as pljech.*78 It can clarify the role of gerontes as judges to some
extent. In important cases, particularly when blood-feud was at stake, a
specific court of elders (plechnija) made the decision from case to case.
It usually consisted of twelve people, but the number of members was
not strictly fixed. Also elders (plechniars) were not necessarily the same
persons, although they often came from the same circle of people.*79
They were sitting in a semi-circle with their legs crossed, faced to each
another, leaving in the middle enough space for the parties and other
persons supposed to speak during the trial.*80 Members of the plechnija
receive a certain sum of money, but only when and if the case is solved.
The judicial reward was usually called “compensation for the shoes”.*81
[Personal Warranty in Customary Law of Albanians in Nothern Metohia – dorzon], Belgrade
1973 (unpublished PhD thesis); H. Ismaili, Plećnija u običajnom pravu Albanaca [Plechnija
in CustomaryLaw of Albanians], Belgrade 1978 (unpublished PhD thesis). Also, those two
interesting PhD thesis’ were never translated in some more accesible language.
*78 W. Leaf, 126, n 1. says wrongly “pljech or village council (literally – gerousia)”.
However, sometimes there could be only one plechnar, M. Djuričić, 349.
*79 The most in debt analysis of plechnia, as a result not only of interpreting Code of Leke
Dukagjini, but also based upon personal examination and interviews with the people still
involved in the old habits, is H. Ismaili, (1978), 20. See also in Serbian R. Halili, “Plećnija
u zakoniku Leke Dukadjinija” [Plechnija in the Code of Leke Dukagjini), Anali Pravnog
fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade], 5 (1978), pp. 531. See also
M. Djuričić, „Veća staraca kod Albanaca na Kosovu“ [Council of elders at Kosovo], Anali
Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade], 5 (1984), pр.
708-726; M. Djuričić, „Činioci krvne osvete kod Albanaca” [Factors of Blood-Feud among
Albanians], Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade],
6 (1993), pр. 687-692.
*80 H. Ismaili, 62.
*81 H. Ismaili, 53; Code of Leke Dukagjini, art. 1021. Parties give the same amount for the
elders “shoes”. The term is evidently used in a figurative sense, stressing that the amount only
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Most frequent cases that appeared before the plechnija were murder cases,
but also cases dealing with wounding, debts, theft, property rights, family,
marriage, etc.*82
But the second specific institution in the procedure before plechnija leads
us closer to the istor. It was called dorzon, dorzanët (literally: guarantor,
guarantors). The role of dorzon is closely connected with the “judgment”
of plechnija, as plechnar or plechnars do not basically rule like judges.
They do not give any verdict, but they only expose their opinion on what
is right and how to determine the damage amount. However, without the
dorzon their decision would be only a non-forcible legal opinion, and this
is why the plechnar has the dorzon in order to fulfill the decision.*83 The
dorzon is a guarantee that the opinion of the plechnar will be respected.
Dorzon is a person elected by the parties to take care of the decision to
be properly fulfilled.*84 Each party acquired their own dorzon, but there
are specific provisions for blood-feud dorzon. He has to take care that the
decision of plechnija will be accomplished in time and as it was given.
If the killer tries to escape or to prolong due payment, dorzon calls him
in front of the gathered people to warn him.*85 Blood-money is always
given to the dorzon by the murderer and dorzon passes it to the family of
the victim – it is not tolerated that murderer pays the blood-money to the
victim’s family directly.*86
has to compensate costs of their arrival. However, in practice the amount was considerably
higher, H. Ismaili, 54.
*82 H. Ismaili, 36.
*83 M. Djuričić, (1973), 351.
*84 H. Ismaili, 178. This example from comparative legal history might generally support an
idea by E. Cantarella, (2002), 160; (2012), 186 that istor was a person who guaranteed that
the blood-money will be correctly paid in accordance with the word given.
*85 Code of Leke Dukagjini, art. 980.
*86 Code of Leke Dukagjini, art. 981.
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Shortly, dorzon had multiply functions as a person of public faith.*87 He
is there to remember what was the opinion of the plechnija, to take care that
it will be fulfilled, he is “one-who-knows” the case, who is a guarantee of
the blood-feud contract and who is in charge of proper accomplishment of
the compromise (opinion of the plechnia). And he is supposed to remem-
ber, and attest if necessary, the outcome of the case in the coming decades,
until the end of his life. Dorzon is a warranty in many legal acts (inheri-
tance, different contracts), but his role is particularly important in blood-
feud cases. Blood-feud procedure is performed through two contracts.*88
The first one is an agreement about the blood-feud when one party perma-
nently waives demand to seek for the blood-price, while the other party
takes burden to pay certain amount as a compensation for the forgiven
death. The second is a contract about protection of the agreement by the
dorzon who takes care that the contract will be fully completed.
Although there are plenty of associations that may connect plechnija and
dorzon with the Homeric istor in many aspects, there are probably also
numerous differences between those institutions. However it seems that
at least they served to a similar purpose – to have someone who will take
care as a warranty of the contracts or decision of the Court of elders (to be
fulfilled as ruled, and to keep all important details of the case remembered,
similarly as mnamon was in charge to do in Gortyn or pristav among Slav
people in Middle Ages).
*87 M. Djuričić, (1973), 175-214.
*88 M. Djuričić, (1973), 349.
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4. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding that most English translators take for granted that the
istor is a judge or an arbiter, it seems that istor was not in charge to decide,
particularly murder or blood-money cases. Those issues were probably
not ruled by a single person, particularly in early societies. Also, it is quite
doubtful whether a primitive democratic body, consisted of people gathered
at random, was eligible to reach reasonable decision in complicated cases
like this, asMac Dowell and Lanni suggest. Homeric society is deeply aris-
tocratic and eventual formal confirmation of elder’s decision by the crowd
was probably out of their capacity. The crowd can of course express their
feelings and attitudes during the public judicial process but without any
formal legal significance. Like in many other primitive societies the court
of elders, the gerontes were authorized to give a final verdict. But, what
was the role of the istor then?
The theory that the istor was one of the elders who gave the best judg-
ment or that the istor was the chair-man of the gerontes has many defi-
ciencies: it is in contradiction with the very sequence of Homeric verses,
with comparative early law experience, with the whole settings, with the
linguistic background, etc. So, the question remains what is responsibility
of the istor? If the istor was one who decided the case (as plenty of trans-
lators suggest), why were gerontes needed at all? Or there were two types
of judges involved? Having in mind primarily philological and compar-
ative arguments, it seems that istor was only a person who helped to the
gerontes to reach the best possible verdict. He was a person of public faith
who knows what he has seen (oida as the root of istor) and his role was
to report to the crowd and the elders what relevant elements he knows and
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remembers. His statement was very important particularly considering an
oral judicial procedure, which was not strictly fixed and could vary in many
aspects.
But, even if so, there are two possibilities in our case. The istor was
there either to help in solving a legal matter (if blood-money is acceptable
or not) or a matter of fact (whether the blood-money was paid in a proper
way).
Although theory that the issue was about a legal matter seems to be quite
vulnerable, let us examine a possible role of the istor in that case. If the
issue was controversial considering a tough legal question of blood-feud
relevance, why was presence of istor so necessary? If his opinion was so
important, what was the role of gerontes then? There is only a slight possi-
bility that the istor was at hand to remember and remind the audience if the
blood-money was accepted in some comparable cases before.*89 He might
have reported in which way the blood-feud was replaced by blood-money
(poine) in the concrete situation or, maybe, to add his remembrance and
offer his information on some other important issue at stake. Blood-feud
was not replaced with blood-price routinely, all at once, always and in all
situations in the same way, but it almost certainly depended on some partic-
ular characteristics of the concrete murder. Only in that sense istor could
conclude (peirar) the preliminary dilemma if blood-money was previously
acceptable in comparable circumstances. But in any case he does not make
a decision. Of course, that presumption about the role of the istor is quite
susceptible, as much as the whole hypothesis on legal matter as a subject
*89 M. Gagarin (2003), 68 is right that there in no evidence thatmnamones in Gortyn remem-
bered the outcomes of earlier cases as precedents or rules for new cases. But argumentum ex
silentio does not mean that something similar did not take place, particularly if one takes into
consideration the role of pristav in Medieval Slavic law.
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of the Homeric trial scene is vulnerable. The very presence of the istor and
explanation of his role makes a great problem for that theory.
If the issue was the one of facts, namely if the blood-moneywas correctly
disbursed or if it was paid or not, what sounds more plausible, makes the
case more relaxed and the role of istor could be more easily explained.
The responsibility of the istor was quite similar to the one of the pristav
in the customs of Slavs or to the function of the dorzon among Albanians
from Kosovo and Metohija. The istor does not rule as the case was already
solved by a compromise during his presence. He only informs the gerontes
about something that he knows (as a person of public faith), about some-
thing that he was supposed to supervise and as a guarantee/guarantor of the
accomplishment of the decision. He is present in the Homeric trial scene to
report what was wrong in accomplishing the blood-feud compromise, as he
is one-who-knows. This is why the gerontes speak in turn about different
possibilities after his statement. Sequence of verses clearly points to that.
In any case function of the istor was not to decide the case but to report
about some relevant issues. His statement could be related to the history
of the actual clash (about the content of the decision, about the details and
manner of its enforcement, etc.), although it is not impossible that the istor
was also free to mention other cases that he had observed before.*90 The
istor’s statement could affect the final verdict and this is why the parties and
the audience are so excited to hear what he is going to say. However, the
final decision on how to solve the concrete dispute, depending on specific
elements of the case, is in hands of the gerontes only.
Many societies without written judicial procedure used persons of public
faith in a similar role of “rememberer”, of a person “who knows” the facts
*90 Previous decisions were taken into account when plechnija was ruling, H, Ismaili, 152.
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relevant for the process. This is probably one of the points of the phrase
epi istori - facts that he has seen and remember are basically a non-written
archive of the case. Therefore, the istor is an important person who is
present during the process, a man of public faith whose knowledge could
be decisive, but he is not a decision maker.
This is why Mac Dowell’s translation sounds quite tolerable, but only
in its first part: “both wished to obtain trial at the hands of istor”. Mac
Dowel is among the rare English speaking authors who avoided statement
that parties wanted to obtain decision, verdict, judgment or something very
binding by the istor. The only problem with Mac Dowell’s approach is
that he translated istor as a judge, merging the role of gerontes and istor
(as many other scholars also did as well). But, Homer clearly says that the
elders do dikazein, while istor is only related to peirar helesthai. They give
the judgment based upon the facts of each specific case, taking seriously
istor’s statement. His role in a preliterate societywas surely very important.
He was a “walking archive of judiciary”, his report could strongly affect
the final decision by the elders, but he was not a person authorized to come
to a decision.
At the end here is a suggestion for the future English translators. The
best solution in translating istor in the Iliad’s trial scene at the shield of
Achilles should be to avoid either “judge” or “arbiter” or “witness”. Having
in mind comparative data depicted in this paper, particularly the role of
dorzon amongAlbanians, a bit more acceptable term could be “warranty”,
or “guarantee” like pristav in old Slavic law, or “guarantor” like Agamem-
non in theHomeric funeral race scene (in convincingThür’s interpretation).
Of course, the easiest approach for translators would be to keep the orig-
inal Greek word istor, like mnamon of the Code of Gortyn is never trans-
lated by any modern alternative term. “One-who-knows”, as suggested by
HOMERIC HISTOR (Il. 18., 497-508) 153
Hammond (although probably with different connotations in his view) and
“Wissenden” by Thür in German, could be also a good choice to trans-
late Homeric istor, as it would fit better to his probable role in the judicial
process. Modern legal terminology can not offer a better single-word trans-
lation for the Homeric istor.
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